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Emerging Multinationals from Mid-Range Economies:  
The Influence of Institutions and Factor Markets 
 
Abstract 
This paper revisits and extends our earlier work (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng, 
2005) in the pages of this Journal. We argue that there is a need for more fine-grained 
understanding of the country context along two dimensions: (1) institutional development and (2) 
infrastructure and factor market development. Specifically, we propose an enriched typology of 
emerging economies with a focus on mid-range emerging economies, which are positioned 
between traditional emerging economies and newly developed economies. Then we examine 
new multinationals from these mid-range emerging economies that have internationalized both 
regionally and globally. We outline directions for further research based on this typology in 
terms of (1) government influence, (2) resource orchestration, (3) market entry, and (4) corporate 
governance regarding the internationalization strategy of these emerging multinationals from 
mid-range economies.  
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Since the publication of our earlier paper (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng, 2005) in 
this Journal, emerging economies as a whole have continued to gain in prominence both in terms 
of their contributions to global GDP as well as to foreign direct investment (FDI). As the 
companion article shows, strategy research with a focus on emerging economies has also 
continued to flourish (Xu and Meyer, 2013). It is gratifying to be informed that Wright et al. 
(2005) has not only become the most cited Journal of Management Studies (JMS) paper focusing 
on emerging economies, but also one of the most cited JMS papers since 2005. In this follow-up 
paper, our guiding question is: What is the most important development in both strategy research 
and practice on emerging economies that has now become a crucial component of the literature 
that deserves our attention?   
In writing the 2005 paper, which was the introduction to a JMS special issue on “Strategy 
Research in Emerging Economies: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom”, we were building 
upon an earlier special research forum (SRF) of the Academy of Management Journal (AMJ). In 
that AMJ SRF, two of us (Hoskisson and Wright) had been guest editors. The other two of us 
(Filatotchev and Peng) had contributed papers covering varying strategic characteristics of 
emerging economies, notably on downsizing in Eastern Europe (Filatotchev et al., 2000) and 
managerial ties in China (Peng and Luo, 2000), respectively. The editors’ introduction to that 
AMJ SRF (Hoskisson et al., 2000) has also become widely cited.  
In Wright et al. (2005), our starting point was the increase in strategy papers focusing on 
emerging economies that had occurred in the previous five years. We argued that to “make a 
lasting contribution there is a need to consider the extent to which theories and methods used to 
study strategy in mature, developed economies are suited to the unique social, political, and 
economic contexts as well as firm characteristics of emerging economies” (Wright et al., 2005: 
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2). We noted that this challenge was magnified by the heterogeneity of emerging economies. We 
went on to build a new framework that highlighted four strategic options: (1) foreign firms 
entering emerging economies, (2) domestic firms competing within emerging economies, (3) 
firms from emerging economies entering other emerging economies, and (4) firms from 
emerging economies entering developed economies. We then considered the applicability of four 
conceptual approaches identified in Hoskisson et al. (2000) to these four strategic options. These 
conceptual approaches were transaction cost theory (TCT), agency theory (AT), resource-based 
theory (RBT), and institutional theory (IT). In Wright et al. (2005) we noted that IT had become 
more enduring in its application to emerging economies than anticipated in Hoskisson et al. 
(2000) as the nature of institutional developments had not been uni-directional. In this paper we 
build upon this heterogeneity in the development of emerging economies that was left 
unexplored in the 2005 paper. 
If the notion of “emerging economies” is to be meaningful, over time at least some of the 
64 countries identified by Hoskisson et al. (2000) may be expected to have progressed beyond 
the initial status. Although some countries (such as Nigeria and Tajikistan) have undoubtedly 
stagnated, a number of emerging economies have increased both the development of their market 
institutions as well as the necessary economic infrastructure to be considered “mid-range 
emerging economies” between (newly) developed economies and traditional emerging 
economies. We argue that BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) may be classified in 
this category as mid-range emerging economies, although some significant differences within 
BRIC countries still remain. Many firms from these countries have been pursuing outward FDI 
(OFDI) opportunities beyond their home countries, thus becoming a new breed of multinationals 
(Guillén and García-Canal, 2009; Mathews, 2006) or emerging multinationals (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
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and Genc, 2008; Gammeltoft, Filatotchev and Hobdari, 2012; Peng, 2012; Ramamurti and Singh, 
2009; Sun et al. 2012; Yang et al., 2009).  
Although Wright et al. (2005) also developed this theme, our focus then was on the need 
for analysis of the different roles of social capital and networks in facilitating entry into 
emerging versus developed economies by emerging economy firms. We welcome and are 
honored by this opportunity to revisit and extend our earlier paper. In the present paper, instead 
of arguing for a broad and comprehensive strategy research agenda as in Wright et al. (2005) 
(and also in Hoskisson et al. [2000]), we focus on a relatively narrow but highly promising 
research agenda: the relationship between the development of institutions and factor markets in 
mid-range economies and the emergence of new multinationals. Specifically, we advance an 
improved typology to explore the range of MNE strategies pursued by firms from mid-range 
economies (see Figure 1) by highlighting the dynamic interaction between various institutional 
and factor market aspects. These mid-range emerging economies are interesting, both 
empirically and theoretically. Empirically they are interesting because of their increasing 
economic significance. Theoretically they are interesting as they involve hybrid cases between 
developed and emerging economies. As such, they provide opportunities to extend the 
integration between IT and other theories, as well as to examine the challenges to firms involved 
in moving along the trajectory from an emerging to a developed economy context.      
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
A NEW TYPOLOGY FOR EMERGING ECONOMIES 
A country’s endowed factor markets significantly determine its economic opportunity set 
(Ricardo, 1817; Porter, 1990; Wright, 1990). However, North (1990) recognized that, in addition 
to these endowed factors traditionally emphasized in classical economics, institutions represent 
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important elements in influencing business activities. Wan and Hoskisson (2003) noted that 
endowed “factors are used to produce goods or services (that is, they are used for 
transformational activities), whereas institutions are used for the exchange of inputs and outputs 
with other firms (that is, for transactional activities)” (p. 28). As a result, both institutions and 
factor markets help firms capture profitable economic opportunities such as those captured by 
FDI. Of course, both institutions and factor markets do not have impact in isolation from each 
other: factor markets form a basis for production activities in a specific country, while 
institutions may facilitate both production and distribution of generated rents through better 
contractual assurance (Krug and Hendrischke, 2012; Zhou and Peng, 2012). 
The importance of institutions has been emphasized recently, especially in research 
examining the large-scale institutional transitions that have occurred in many emerging 
economies (Carney et al., 2009; Filatotchev et al., 2012; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Krug and 
Hendrischke, 2012; Meyer and Peng, 2005; Peng, 2003; Wright et al., 2005). This research has 
culminated in a new institution-based view that features prominently in the strategy and 
international business (IB) literature (Ahuja and Yayavaran, 2011; Dunning and Lundan, 2008; 
Khoury and Peng, 2011; Kim et al., 2010; Meyer et al., 2009a; Peng et al., 2008, 2009).  
We combine classic economic research focused on the importance of factor markets with 
the more recent emphasis on the importance of institutions that has emerged in the strategy and 
IB literatures. We argue that significant diversity of initial conditions, transition paths, and 
competitive outcomes among emerging economies makes it imperative to move away from the 
all-encompassing label of “emerging economies.” As the heterogeneity of developed economies 
is being increasingly researched (Hall and Soskice, 2001), so the label of “emerging economies” 
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needs to recognize that these countries are also not homogenous. While this single label has been 
useful in the past, we believe that it is time to enrich it as these economies diverge.  
Specifically, we argue that the two dimensions illustrated in Figure 1 help differentiate 
various mid-range economies. Vertically, the development of market-supporting political, legal, 
and economic institutions—which, for compositional and graphical simplicity, we label as 
“institutional development” in Figure 1—has been noted as a crucial dimension of institutional 
transitions in many emerging economies (Peng, 2003). Horizontally, the development of 
infrastructure and factor markets—which we label as “infrastructure and factor market 
development” in Figure 1—is also crucial (Porter, 1990; Wan, 2005; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). 
Previous research has identified several measures to position countries within this typology. 
Further into the paper we use data from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Report to map out possible clusters of emerging economies. 
Traditional Emerging Economies: Low Institutional Development and Low Infrastructure 
and Factor Development (Quadrant 1) 
Traditional emerging economies suffer from both the lack of institutional development 
and the lack of infrastructure and factor market development (Quadrant 1 in Figure 1). Most 
emerging economies 20 years ago would fit this description. Today, some that have made 
relatively little progress along these two dimensions (such as Bangladesh) still exist.  
However, much has changed. Rapid development since the publication of Hoskisson et 
al. (2000) and especially since the publication of Wright et al. (2005), when the distinction 
among various types of emerging economies was not clear enough to be observed, has made this 
characterization of emerging economies less accurate for many countries. Although the scale and 
scope of institutional development and infrastructure and factor market development can be 
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historically path dependent, it appears there can be significant variance. Such wide-ranging 
development has resulted in the emergence of a class of mid-range emerging economies that both 
differ from traditional emerging economies and from developed economies. Given this 
evolution, we describe some of these strategic issues in the three remaining quadrants of Figure 1 
below and later address specific research question by some significant topic areas.  
Mid-range Emerging Economies (Type 1): Low Institutional Development and High 
Infrastructure and Factor Development (Quadrant 2) 
These environments have relative well-endowed infrastructure and factor markets, but 
inadequate institutional development (Bai and Qian, 2010). While transformational resources are 
generally available, the costs of resource acquisition and subsequent economic transactions are 
high (Zhou and Delios, 2012). In this regard, OFDI would seem a good strategy from these 
resource environments. OFDI ostensibly represents an exit option for firms to use their 
capabilities in home countries with limited factor market development and make use of host 
countries with better institutional development lacking in home countries (Witt and Lewin, 2007; 
Yamakawa et al., 2009). However, such firms may find it difficult to operate in markets with 
better institutional development. Thus, firms from these markets may seek to leverage their 
capabilities developed in relatively munificent factor markets. 
For example, Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) argued that in transition economies, where 
weak institutions fail to support economic growth, a strong central government can play a role in 
fostering growth. For example, many countries from the former Soviet Union have relatively 
well developed infrastructure systems, albeit rather dated, some of which is leftover from the 
centralized state approach to managing the Soviet Union. Similarly, Thailand has had many 
mega-infrastructure projects to build roads, airports, and subways because the military has taken 
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over several times given political instability (the latest military coup was in 2006). This has led 
to a more centralized approach to infrastructure development, but institutional development has 
lagged, given poorly functioning legal and market institutions (Davies, 2006).   
We argue that relative country positioning in Figure 1 may contribute to the emerging 
multinational firm’s ability to both exploit their capabilities as well as influence the policy and 
incentive for OFDI to use or overcome factor market and institutional development in the home 
country as new MNEs go abroad. For example, many Chinese firms made acquisitions that 
subsequently failed in their early OFDI efforts into developed economies (Williamson and 
Raman, 2011). Future research associated with this quadrant may examine the nature of success 
factors that facilitate OFDI when factor markets are relatively stronger than institutions. 
Likewise, researchers need to examine which type of inward FDI is successful in developing the 
skills of emerging multinationals. We explore these and other issues more fully in our future 
research section below. 
Mid-range Emerging Economies (Type 2): High Institutional Development and Low 
Infrastructure and Factor Development (Quadrant 3) 
Compared to many other Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition economies, 
Poland has been able to foster better institutional development post breakup of the Soviet bloc.  
Besides its rapid approach to liberalization (shock therapy) after the political revolution in 1989, 
it restored democratic institutions, which existed historically more so than among other CEE 
transition economies. Many formal changes were supported by informal norms and behaviors 
comprising part of the fabric of Polish society (Marvin, 2010; Meyer and Peng, 2005). 
Accordingly, Poland’s institutional development has outpaced its infrastructure development. In 
another example, India has relatively strong democratic political institutions, which has often 
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created gridlock and at times stymied market advance. More stifling, however, is its relative poor 
infrastructure and factor market development. Some Indian firms have used OFDI to overcome 
India’s lack of infrastructure development and have taken advantage of their natural resources 
and understanding of better market institutions to develop new MNEs in global markets 
(Majumdar et al., 2012). Indian acquisitions in developed economies tend to be undertaken by 
private firms, which are more receptive in host countries. This contrasts significantly with most 
Chinese acquisitions that tend to be undertaken by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which 
encounter significant suspicion and resistance in developed economies. Because SOEs are often 
perceived as manifestations of national interests, international expansions of SOEs are oftentimes 
obstructed due to concerns over national security. For example, the US Congress rejected the 
acquisition of Unocal Oil Company by CNOOC—a large Chinese energy SOE on the grounds 
that CNOOC represented the interests of the Chinese Communist Party in 2005 (Wan and Wang. 
2009). 
The lack of infrastructure development has stifled some industries. The Indian 
automobile industry is less developed domestically, although several Indian firms have made 
acquisitions of foreign auto firms (Kale, Singh and Raman, 2009). Tata Motors pursued the 
acquisition of Jaguar and Land Rover to continue its emergence in the global automobile 
industry that had previously included the acquisition of Daewoo and Hispano (light trucks). 
However, the Indian automobile industry as a whole is significantly behind the Chinese 
automobile industry, primarily because of India’s poor transportation infrastructure (especially 
its underdeveloped road and highway system). For example, traffic problems in Indian cities 
create congestion because narrow and under-developed streets are a constraint. Alternatively, 
Indian firms such as Infosys and Wipro in global technology and consulting have done very well. 
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This is largely because these industries do not rely significantly on domestic infrastructure. 
These firms initiated as sources for other firms to do business process outsourcing in India and 
then were able to develop into worldwide service firms given the well-developed educational 
institutions besides the initial conditions associated with Indian society such as good language 
skills and available labor.  
In summary, new MNEs from Quadrant 3 may be able to move to developed markets 
more readily because their home country institutional development will be closer to that in more 
developed economies. In other words, there is a shorter institutional distance between MNEs 
from this quadrant and developed markets (Xu and Shenkar, 2002). But future research 
addressing the best approach for both OFDI as well as inward FDI to foster improved 
capabilities for such new MNEs is yet to be developed fully. 
Newly Developed Economies: High Institutional Development and High Infrastructure and 
Factor Development (Quadrant 4) 
Some economies have clearly graduated from the “emerging” phase and become what we 
call “newly developed economies.” An exemplar country is South Korea (Chang and Hong, 
2000) as it has more balanced institutional and infrastructure/factor market development. 
Because the sources of competitive advantages in these home resource environments rest on 
continuous improvements in the value chain, with specialized knowledge and skills, OFDI may 
perform better than in home country contexts where both factor markets and institutions are less 
developed. Thus, firms from countries in this quadrant may be aggressive in their strategies in 
less developed countries because sophisticated consumer demand at home also drives firms to 
improve continuously (Porter, 1990). However, there remain many countries more developed in 
12 
 
both factor markets and institutions. As a result, entering more developed markets may be 
challenging.  
Recent research (Kim, Hoskisson, and Lee, 2012b) has documented that Korean firms 
have sought to use two types of strategies: going to less developed economies where they have 
superior resource advantages and going to more-developed economies to learn and build skills 
beyond their more basic upstream capabilities. This has also been evident in the approach 
undertaken by some MNEs from Latin America. Mexico’s CEMEX expanded into less-advanced 
Latin American economies of Venezuela and Colombia because CEMEX had superior home-
grown firm-specific advantages. Later, it entered more developed economies through 
acquisitions in the U.S. and elsewhere as its skills developed. Thus, more research is needed to 
understand how these new MNEs pursue their overseas opportunities in global markets, given 
the background development of their home country factor markets and institutions. 
Finally, in the middle area of Figure 1, Brazil and Mexico can be placed as examples. 
This third type of mid-range economies is characterized by some improved democratic political 
institutions and improved infrastructure and factor market development. Clearly, more research 
is needed on these economies, given they are on track in both dimensions.  
To summarize, what Hoskisson et al. (2000) and Wright et al. (2005) considered as a 
homogeneous pool of emerging economies has evolved over recent years into a diverse matrix of 
economies characterized by a wide range of institutional and economic characteristics. This 
phenomenon provides an opportunity for theory building and empirical research, and in the 
following sections we outline some of these opportunities. 
RECATEGORIZING EMERGING ECONOMIES: AN ILLUSTRATIVE ANALYSIS 
13 
 
To illustrate how emerging economies may be categorized into the quadrants of our framework, 
we began by operationalizing institutional and infrastructure contexts and then conducted cluster 
analysis on the emerging economies identified by Hoskisson et al. (2000). We drew on measures 
available in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2011-12 (GCR) 
(Schwab, 2011) related to the institutional and factor market developments. Specifically, we 
operationalized institutional development by the score on this measure in the GCR. Infrastructure 
and factor market development were operationalized by summing and averaging the 
Infrastructure, Macroeconomic environment and Health & Education measures in the GCR into 
one measure.  
To identify clusters, an adaptive version of K-means clustering was employed. We 
standardized our variables before performing the clustering algorithm. K-means clustering is 
initialized with values for the centers of the clusters, and then the algorithm iteratively assigns 
observations to the nearest center to develop clusters. At the end of each iteration, a new mean 
for the cluster is calculated, and observations are reassigned. To increase performance, there is 
an incremental version of k-means that allows the centers of the clusters to be re-calculated as 
each observation is added to the clusters, rather than waiting until each iteration before re-
calculating the mean (Ghosh, 2003). We implemented the incremental k-means clustering using 
PROC FASTCLUS in SAS. Our initial centers for five groups based on the pairs (standardized 
infrastructure score, institutions score) were assigned as follows: the low-low cluster was 
initialized at (2, 2), low-high at (2, 6), middle-middle at (4, 4), high-low at (6, 2), and high-high 
at (6, 6).  The resulting clusters and mean (unstandardized) institutional and infrastructure scores 
by cluster group are found in Table 1 and the countries by cluster group along with raw 
institutional and infrastructure scores are found in Table 2. Please note that four of the 64 
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original countries classified by Hoskisson, et al. (2000) were not available for this study due to 
missing data: Belarus, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe. 
[INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE] 
Assuming that countries generally started in the Low-Low quadrant (Quadrant 1 in 
Figure 1), two clear trends emerge: some countries have not moved beyond this quadrant (Group 
1 in Figure 2), while a small number developed both institutions and factor markets in the High-
High quadrant (e.g., Slovenia, Israel) (Group 5 in Figure 2). The majority of countries are 
grouped more closely together, perhaps a reflection that they may still be in an emerging 
trajectory, but do fall into distinct clusters with relatively higher or lower scores on our two 
measures.  A cluster of countries with relatively higher institutional development and relatively 
lower infrastructure development (Group 4 in Figure 2) is comparable to our High-Low 
Quadrant 2 in Figure 1. A further cluster of countries has relatively low institutional 
development scores but relatively high infrastructure scores (Group 2 in Figure 2), corresponding 
to our Low-High Quadrant 3 in Figure 1. Finally, countries in Group 3 in Figure 2 fall in the 
middle. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Figure 2 reveals a number of interesting patterns. The mid-range area seems to be mostly 
populated by a number of former Soviet republics (e.g., Russia, Ukraine) and several transition 
economies of CEE as well as some traditional developing countries. However, this group is far 
from being homogeneous, with former Soviet republics having relatively less developed 
institutions. This sub-group includes countries with relatively more developed infrastructure but 
also with a high level of state involvement in the economy. On the other hand, some former 
Soviet republics and transition economies (e.g., Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia) exhibit a dramatic 
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evolution along the two dimensions that has occurred in a relatively short period of time. 
Interestingly, Poland is one economy that has a more advanced institutional development score 
compared to other CEE countries, possibly because it had a stronger democratic tradition relative 
to other CEE countries such as Hungary and Russia (Marvin, 2010). 
The stylized typology outlined in Figure 1 indicates that emerging economies can be 
differentiated within a broad spectrum associated with institutional and factor market 
dimensions. More specifically, we predicted theoretically that there will be a substantial number 
of mid-range economies that may be positioned between high institutions/low factor markets and 
low institutions/high factor markets ends of the spectrum. To avoid theoretical ambiguity we also 
suggested that institutional and factor market dimensions are orthogonal. However, our cluster 
analysis in Figure 2 indicates that the areas with two extreme cases (e.g., high institutions/low 
factor markets and low institutions/high factor markets) are very sparsely populated. Most of our 
mid-range economies seem to be located within the area of medium level of development of both 
institutions and factor markets. This highlights that our chosen dimensions may be inter-
dependent. Indeed, economists argue that to have developed factor markets requires adequate 
level of institutional support, and vice versa. For example, to have developed capital markets, a 
specific emerging economy would require different forms of institutional support, such as legal 
protection of minority investors, prudent regulation, etc. This conjecture opens up an interesting 
area for future research that may be focused on the co-evolution of institutions and factor 
markets, and its effects on business strategy. However, the analysis suggests that there is still 
substantial variance among these factors between countries. Interestingly, the factor market and 
infrastructure development has more variance between countries than the institutional factor 
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(even after the factors are standardized), which has been the emphasis of some much recent 
research. 
FUTURE RESEARCH ON NEW MULTINATIONALS FROM MID-RANGE 
EMERGING ECONOMIES 
Interestingly, most new or emerging multinationals originate from mid-range emerging 
economies (Quadrants 2 and 3 of Figure 1). Multinationals from newly developed economies 
such as South Korea have been active internationally about a decade earlier than the newly 
emerging multinationals from BRIC (Kim, Kim, and Hoskisson, 2010; Kim, Hoskisson, and Lee, 
2012). Multinationals from Quadrant 1 emerging economies with poor institutional as well as 
infrastructure and factor market development are at an early stage of development. But new 
multinationals from mid-range emerging economies have become a new breed of global 
competitors commanding enormous research attention (Gammeltoft et al., 2010; 2012; Guillén 
and García-Canal, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007; Peng, 2012; Sun et al., 2012).  
In Wright et al. (2005), despite our identification that firms from emerging economies 
entering other emerging economies and firms from emerging economies entering developed 
economies would be two of the four major strategic options that firms undertake and that 
researchers should focus on,1 none of the eight articles in the 2005 JMS special issue dealt with 
emerging multinationals.2 Despite such a lack of research, Wright et al. (2005: 25) made a 
forward looking prediction:  
                                                 
1
 The other two strategic options are firms from developed economies entering emerging economies and 
domestic firms competing within emerging economies. These two areas attracted seven of the eight 
articles in the 2005 JMS special issue (Wright et al., 2005). They also have continued to attract significant 
research attention (Shi, Sun, and Peng, 2013). 
2
 The only article in the 2005 JMS special issue that touched on both strategic options of such market 
entries is Brouthers et al. (2005). But Brouthers et al. (2005) study exporters, which, by definition, are not 
multinationals that engage in FDI.   
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There is relatively little research on the internationalization of emerging economy firms either 
into other emerging economies or into developed economies . . . As emerging economies develop 
and firms within them develop their expertise, we suggest that firms from these economies will 
increasingly take an active interest in developing their strategies outside the home market.    
  
 Clearly, judging by both the volume of post-2005 research on emerging multinationals 
and the scale and scope of the rise of such multinationals around the world, our prediction has 
been supported. How do we make sense of these research opportunities that essentially did not 
exist as of 2005? What are the key questions and directions for future research?  
In Table 3, we outline this emerging research agenda. Figures 1 and 2 suggest that 
multinationals from mid-range economies represent a heterogeneous group of companies that 
operate in different institutional environments and they rely on different economic infrastructures 
and factor markets. Therefore, in Table 3 we take the four quadrants we derived from the 
different combinations of these two dimensions as the basis to organize potential research 
themes. In what follows, we refer to existing studies but, as these remain limited, we present 
illustrative examples to strengthen our insights into future research directions. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Government influence 
Arguably, among various institutional dimensions depicted in Figure 1, the role of governments 
may be of paramount importance in mid-range emerging economies (Li et al., 2012; Zhou and 
Delios, 2012). Governments may provide support to encourage firms to undertake initial 
internationalization, such as the ‘Open Door’ and ‘Go Global’ policies in China. Such support, 
which may be targeted at specific sectors, can provide privileged access to information about 
particular host countries and access to networks that help reduce the liability of foreignness (Cui 
and Jiang, 2010; Luo et al., 2010).   
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While such policies may be useful in stimulating initial internationalization, as mid-range 
emerging economies evolve and the internationalization experience of the emerging 
multinationals develops, there may be a need for a reassessment and redirection of support. At 
present, we know little about how the nature of government support for internationalization has 
changed as mid-range emerging economies have evolved and how this has affected firm 
behavior. As mid-range economy firms develop more experience in various host countries, such 
experience may complement or substitute for mid-range home country government support for 
internationalization. 
In traditional emerging economies (Quadrant 1), management may be especially reliant 
on support provided by political connections to access the means for internationalization. For 
example, emerging economy governments can use promotional tools, including trade shows and 
inter-government agreements, to directly assist exports and OFDI. OFDI promotion policies set 
by emerging economy governments are institutionally complementary to offsetting competitive 
disadvantages of emerging multinationals in global competition. In emerging economies, weakly 
developed institutions and government promotions for internationalization may coexist. 
Emerging economy governments may offer direct support such as providing a low cost of capital 
for emerging multinationals (Buckley et al., 2010) and indirect support including negotiation of 
bilateral treaties with host country governments to protect OFDI. For example, the Korean 
government provided strong support enabling Korean firms to invest heavily abroad at relatively 
low cost in their early internationalization stages (Lau, 2003). Since the implementation of the 
‘Go Global’ policy in 2000, the Chinese government has been more directive in establishing a set 
of guidelines for Chinese OFDI that create incentives for OFDI (Quadrant 3), streamline 
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administrative procedures, ease capital controls, inform firms investment opportunities, and 
reduce political and investment risks in OFDI (Buckley et al., 2008). 
In contrast, in Brazil much internationalization has come through government-supported 
financial institutions (Turner, 2011). In 2010, Marfrig, a Brazilian meat packer, acquired 
Keystone Foods for $1.25 billion. Keystone is a top supplier to American fast food chains such 
as Subway and McDonald’s. In 2012, Brazil’s JBS, the world’s largest meat packer, bought 
Pilgrim’s Pride for $800 million and Swift for $1.4 billion. Both firms have U.S.-centric meat 
packing operations, which gives JBS a significant exposure in the United States. These 
acquisitions were largely made possible by Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), which 
supports Brazilian firms in developing their international operations and allows them to increase 
their bids relative to competing bids (Hope, Thomas, and Vyas, 2011; Samora, 2011). Petrobras, 
the government-owned oil monopoly, bought a significant interest in Devon Energy’s stake in 
the Gulf of Mexico’s Cascade field. Banco do Brasil, a large and mostly government-owned 
bank, received a license to open branch banks across the United States and also began 
acquisitions by acquiring a small, Florida-based lender, EuroBank. Banco do Brasil has a 
presence in 23 countries in addition to Brazil. Thus, significant government influence still is 
apparent in many mid-range economies such as Brazil (Quadrant 2). Whether such support has 
meant that acquirers have overpaid or whether it has enabled Brazilian firms to implement 
strategies to create value that would otherwise not have been possible in the context of under-
developed capital markets remains to be seen in future research. 
As these economies’ institutions and economic infrastructure mature, relationships may 
evolve. On the one hand, these political relationships may wither as they are replaced by 
commercial relationships (Quadrant 4) or they may persist through inertia or through personal 
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relationships (Li et al., 2012; Peng, 2003; Zhou and Peng, 2010). With the development of factor 
markets, firms may rely less on state subsidies and direct support when venturing abroad. From 
Figure 2 it is clear that there is more variance among countries in regard to factor market and 
infrastructure development compared to institutional development. While research emphasis 
hitherto has been on institutional development, examination of how the variance in factor market 
and infrastructure development influences both OFDI and IFDI is needed. Better infrastructure 
has helped China receive more FDI than other countries (Bai and Qian, 2010). In addition to 
government incentives, government’s investment in improved infrastructure has probably 
facilitated IFDI, but research is needed to test this conjecture. Better factor markets have likely 
provided better strategic resources (Barney, 1986) and thus advantages to firms pursuing OFDI 
compared to less developed counties (Kim et al., 2012). As such, understanding how government 
support for domestic factor market and infrastructure development in the home country helps 
internationalization needs more in-depth research. Further research is needed that examines the 
extent to which these aspects of informal and formal aspects of government involvement 
continue to facilitate internationalization or come to frustrate it. 
 Another dimension of influence of governments for FDI from emerging economies is the 
negative role played by governments (Morck et al., 2008; Witt and Lewin, 2007; Yamakawa et 
al, 2009). There can be concern about the political rationale of SOEs in attempted foreign 
acquisitions such as the example noted above regarding the case of CNOOC’s failed acquisition 
of Unocal (Wan and Wang, 2009). Also, a look at the top destinations of OFDI from emerging 
economies reveals some surprising patterns: Excluding the special case of Hong Kong, the top 
destination of OFDI stock from China is the British Virgin Islands (BVI) (Peng et al., 2011: 
111). Brazilian multinationals’ top destination in terms of OFDI stock is also the BVI. Russian 
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multinationals have made Cyprus their top OFDI destination. India’s OFDI has flooded into 
Mauritius.  
How can these relatively small economies known as tax havens absorb so much OFDI 
from BRIC countries? A close analysis of available data shows that they do not. In fact, a 
substantial chunk of such OFDI is re-invested back to BRIC—this is known as capital round-
tripping (Fung et al., 2011; Peng, 2012). The leading foreign direct investors (by stock) in Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China are the BVI, Cyprus, Mauritius, and Hong Kong, respectively. In China, 
the BVI has the second largest FDI stock. In other words, the “real” OFDI used to acquire local 
firms, build factories, and compete with local rivals (as often studied by strategy and IB 
researchers) is much smaller than the total OFDI dollar numbers suggest. Why would managers 
and firms in BRIC go through such arduous trouble to engage in capital round-tripping? We 
argue that the institutional weaknesses in the home economies must outweigh the challenges 
associated with such capital round-tripping (Peng, 2012).  
For instance, in Brazil, bureaucratic regulations and heavy taxation on domestic earnings 
have created incentives for firms to invest overseas, especially to tax havens such as the BVI and 
Cayman Islands. In Russia and China, some managers and firms—especially in the private 
sector—worry about political instability, which may result in the expropriation of their assets. In 
India, the License Raj was intimidating. The founders of Mittal Steel (now part of ArcelorMittal) 
were born in India, but unfriendly Indian regulations drove them away to register their firm in 
the Netherlands via OFDI. Then they invested back in India and other countries. Likewise, 
Chinese regulations are friendlier to foreign investors than to domestic firms, especially domestic 
private firms. The Chinese government’s rationale is to use preferential treatment to lure foreign 
firms, and it has largely succeeded in this regard. The flipside is that this policy has 
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discriminated against Chinese firms (especially private ones) and driven many to invest overseas 
so they can re-invest back home as “foreign investors” able to benefit from preferential 
treatment.  
Overall, in response to unfriendly home country institutions, many managers and firms in 
Russia, India, and China have made a rational decision by turning their operations at home into 
“subsidiaries” of foreign firms registered in the likes of Cyprus, Mauritius, Hong Kong, and the 
BVI. In other words, probing deeper into institution-based reasoning behind OFDI from 
emerging economies reveals substantial institutional weakness, which suggests a great deal of 
room for further research.  
Resource orchestration and strategic entrepreneurship 
Figure 1 suggests that business strategies of MNCs from mid-range economies may be shaped, 
inter alia, by a specific constellation of institutions and resources available to an incumbent firm. 
However, these factors represent a necessary but not sufficient condition for a successful 
business strategy, and strategic outcomes would be shaped by the firm’s entrepreneurial 
orientation and resource orchestration capabilities. Strategic entrepreneurship represents an 
attempt to synthesize the resource-based perspective from the strategy literature with opportunity 
recognition from entrepreneurship. This approach emphasizes the need to select and structure 
human, social/network, financial, and technological resources in order to exploit opportunities 
and gain competitive advantage (Ireland et al., 2003). Recent advances in the RBT have focused 
on understanding where resources come from and how they are assembled (Barney, Ketchen, 
and Wright, 2011; Sirmon et al., 2011), including their transfer across national boundaries 
(Meyer, Wright, and Pruthi, 2009b). This process recognizes the dual need both to select and 
structure requisite resources and capabilities, as well as to be able to accumulate, bundle, and 
23 
 
leverage these resources to generate competitive advantage. The resource selection and 
configuration process is influenced by the contexts in which firms operate. 
At present, we know little about how firms from mid-range emerging economies access 
and configure the resources and capabilities they need for internationalization. Further, while 
firms from mid-range emerging economies may enter developed or emerging economies, the 
different challenges in resource accessing and configuration are also underexplored (Yamakawa 
et al., 2009). 
Internationalization represents a corporate entrepreneurial activity involving the 
recognition and exploitation of opportunities in a foreign market. What is not clear is how firms 
develop the requisite entrepreneurial skills for internationalization. Liu et al. (2010a, 2010b) 
have shown how entrepreneurs with educational and work experience in developed economies 
can return to their home economy (in this case China) to create enterprises better placed to 
internationalize than those new ventures where this expertise is absent. There is a need to extend 
this analysis to the case of multinationals from (especially mid-range) emerging economies. To 
what extent are these firms able to recruit returning executives with experience in developed 
economies? How is this related to enhancing internationalization? Similarly, we lack 
understanding of how the challenges in recruiting and utilizing the human and social resources of 
returning executives to enter developed economies are eased as traditional emerging economies 
evolve to become mid-range emerging economies (and eventually and hopefully to become 
newly developed economies). For example, comparing the role of returning entrepreneurs and 
managers for firms in the different quadrants may yield interesting insights into their different 
effectiveness.  
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More generally, internationalization is influenced by the extent to which firm resources 
are fungible to developed or emerging economies or whether they are location-specific (Meyer et 
al., 2009b). Relatedly, this may influence whether firms’ internationalization strategies are to do 
with resource or market seeking. As mid-range emerging economies evolve, new multinationals 
may have less need for resource seeking and shift the balance of activities to market seeking 
(Peng, 2012; Sun et al., 2012) (for example, compare Quadrants 2 and 3). Further, these firms 
may become better placed to transform the resources that have been accessed at early stages of 
evolution into the basis for market seeking activities (Ramamurti, 2012). 
As economies evolve from traditional to mid-range emerging economies, important 
issues concern the extent to which firms adapt their resource orchestration trajectories as their 
home economies have evolved to enable the creation of a competitive advantage and what have 
been the barriers to this adaptation. Yet, it is also important to tease out whether these 
internationalizing firms already possessed key internationalizing resources or whether economy 
level developments facilitate or reinforce access to and configuration of internationalization 
resources that were already in place (Peng, 2012).  
Although we have differentiated the challenges in internationalizing into developed and 
emerging economy contexts with differently developed institutional arrangements, a more fine-
grained delineation of contexts may be warranted (Yamakawa et al., 2008; Zahra and Wright, 
2011). First, new multinationals in mid-range emerging economies within each quadrant of 
Figure 1 may be at different stages of their life-cycle regarding internationalization. This 
temporal dimension of context suggests that resource orchestration activities may differ and 
evolve according to the particular phases of a firm’s life-cycle. Through this process of 
development over time, the new multinational may develop its absorptive capacity to extend and 
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deepen internationalization activities. For example, boards may be augmented with executives 
and non-executives with internationalization expertise from emerging economies initially, but 
with members with greater multinational experience being recruited subsequently. At present, 
this process of evolving boards in such new multinationals is little understood and thus calls for 
more research.  
Second, resource orchestration may be influenced by the social dimension that relates to 
the relationships between the various parties that influence the development of new 
multinationals, such as alliance and trading partners, universities, investors and parent 
corporations. Home country nationals recruited from MNEs in which they have worked in host 
countries may both have direct experience of host country markets and maintain continued 
relationships with these firms. These relationships provide social capital that can help develop 
new multinationals as alliance or trading partners. Similarly, the spillover benefits from 
developed economy MNEs locating in mid-range economies may help internationalization by 
new multinationals.  
Entry strategies 
Institutions in host countries, which affect transaction costs and resource access capabilities of 
firms, significantly shape firms’ market entry strategies and modes (Guler and Guillen, 2010; 
Meyer et al., 2009a). We addressed the challenges of entry by emerging economy firms into 
other markets in Wright et al. (2005). As the firms’ home country context evolves towards being 
more market-oriented, they may adapt entry strategies. 
Firm-specific assets can offset the increased costs of operating in foreign markets 
(Rugman and Verbeke, 2004), but firms from mid-range economies may still lack these 
resources. A low level of development of domestic infrastructure and factor markets in Figure 1 
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may create an additional constraint imposed on the incumbent firm’s ability to rely on external 
support mechanisms. For example, some economies may not have developed capital markets that 
can be used by local firms to raise finance, or local education systems do not train managers able 
to compete globally. Although resource constraints may be important for all firms undertaking 
FDI, domestic factor market constraints are particularly important for the new multinationals.  
As a result, regional internationalization—as opposed to global expansion—may be an 
especially important and feasible initial route to internationalization for firms in the quadrants in 
Figure 1 with weak factor markets that provides a basis for learning before wider 
internationalization. Such geographic proximity reduces the liability of foreignness and resource 
needs compared to inter-region or global internationalization (Qian et al., 2010; Rugman and 
Verbeke, 2004). This is more salient for firms from less developed economies than for developed 
economies because the latter do not suffer from less developed factor markets. Figure 1 also 
suggests the importance of institutional factors, and the institutional environment of regionally 
proximate host countries may be more conducive to market entry. As institutional arrangements 
change the rules of the game, regional trading agreements at country and industry levels may 
help reduce entry barriers. The development of the institutional context in mid-range emerging 
economies may reduce the ‘distance’ to other countries in the region and beyond, making it 
easier for firms from mid-range emerging economies to make the bridge. Further research could 
usefully examine the relative extent of regional versus global entry strategies and modes by firms 
from mid-range emerging economies located in the different quadrants in Figure 1, what drives 
such patterns and changes in these patterns, as well as their effects on performance. Additional 
research could also untangle the extent to which and when new multinationals from mid-range 
emerging economies enter multiple countries with different host country environments regionally 
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or globally. For example, are firms located in economies in Quadrant 4 more likely to make this 
change than firms in the other quadrants?  
 Another area in need of research is the entry mode of the emerging multinationals. MNEs 
generally may select exporting, short-term contracting and joint venture entry modes to avoid 
risks and minimize the uncertainty resulting from weaker institutional environments in host 
countries (Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, and Eden, 2006; Brouthers et al., 2005; Gao et al., 
2010). However, for emerging MNEs, acquisitions seem to be a primary entry mode (Gubbi et 
al., 2010; Lin et al., 2009; Peng, 2012; Sun et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2011b). Why are emerging 
multinationals from China and India so fond of acquisitions? Three reasons emerge. The first is 
the urgency for fast market entry, especially in the areas of natural resources (Deng, 2009). The 
second is to acquire existing world-class brands, such as IBM’s PC brand and Volvo. This 
overcomes a major weakness in emerging multinationals’ capabilities: weak marketing prowess. 
While the first two reasons have been noted by the literature, we believe that there is a third, less 
talked about but clearly evident reason: managerial hubris and empire-building (see the next 
section on “corporate governance”). Understanding of the role of acquisitions may be gained by 
examining the differences in Figure 1 and the role played by differences in new emerging 
economy MNEs’ home country background.  
 Given that globally a substantial proportion of M&As fail, will OFDI-based acquisitions 
undertaken by the new multinationals from different quadrants of Figure 1 do better than global 
average? Since such OFDI is a new phenomenon, its long-run performance is not available now 
but event studies on the initial announcement of acquisitions are mixed.  For example, Chen and 
Young (2010) on Chinese MNEs and Aybar and Ficici (2009) on emerging multinationals in 
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general show that emerging multinationals destroy shareholder value. In contrast, Indian MNEs’ 
acquisitions seem to create shareholder value (Gubbi et al., 2010). 
 Overall, the limited evidence suggests the performance of overseas acquisitions made by 
multinationals from mid-range emerging economies is unlikely to be better than the global 
average. Acquisitions have two phases: pre-acquisition and post-acquisition. During the pre-
acquisition phase, overpayment in bidding is the biggest problem. Hope et al. (2011) find that 
acquiring firms from emerging economies (relative to those from developed economies) have a 
systematic tendency to bid higher in order to acquire assets in developed economies. Hope et al. 
(2011: 131) attribute this to national pride—“an indication that national, social, or political 
considerations could influence decision making of individual decision makers (business owners 
or managers), either rationally or irrationally.” The fact that when bidding for the same targets, 
rival bidders from developed economies back off but emerging multinationals keep increasing 
the offer price is indicative of what has been termed potentially severe managerial hubris (some 
of which may be coated by national pride) (Hope et al., 2011).  
Poor acquisition performance also indicates potential governance failures (e.g., the lack 
of mechanisms to control executives and to pull back), but we will discuss governance issues 
later in the paper. Clearly, overpayment can result in a “winner’s curse” in auctions. In China, 
most announcements of these (typically high-profile) overseas acquisitions end up destroying 
shareholder value, because Chinese investors themselves have little confidence in these MNEs’ 
ability to effectively manage acquisitions (Chen and Young, 2010). Chen and Young’s (2010) 
findings of the value-destroying impact of Chinese MNEs’ announcements of overseas 
acquisitions on shareholder value are corroborated by Aybar and Ficici’s (2009) similar findings, 
based on a larger, more global sample of MNEs from a variety of emerging economies.     
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 During the post-acquisition phase, integration is a leading challenge. From a factor 
market standpoint, managerial talents are an important factor behind the growth of firms and 
economies. Lack of internationally savvy managerial talents at emerging multinationals gives 
little confidence that these firms will be better  at integrating acquired targets and generating 
value. In general, acquirers from emerging economies have often taken the “high road” to 
acquisitions, in which acquirers deliberately allow acquired target companies to retain autonomy, 
keep the top management intact, and then gradually encourage interaction between the two sides 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2010: 24). The “high road” reflects acquirers’ lack of international 
management experience and capabilities. In contrast, the “low road” to acquisitions would be for 
acquirers to act quickly to impose their systems and rules on acquired target companies.  
Overall, the entry modes used and how value is generated in the acquisition process 
represent fertile ground for future research. Comparisons across the quadrants may help reveal to 
what extent acquisitions remain relatively autonomous (e.g., quadrant 1) or integrated with the 
new parent (e.g., Quadrant 4). 
Corporate governance 
Within the complex interplay between institutional environments and factor market development 
in Figure 1, corporate governance of the incumbent firm and its overseas subsidiaries may play 
an important role in setting the internal framework for resource orchestration and strategic 
decisions (Filatotchev et al., 2012; Gammeltoft et al., 2012; Majumdar et al., 2012; Tsao and 
Chen, 2012; Zhou and Delios, 2012). Corporate governance at the headquarters level and of a 
headquarters-subsidiary relationship forms an integral part of the strategic fit between the firm 
and its external environments which have been largely unexplored by studies in IB. Buckley and 
Strange (2011) argue that to the extent that the IB literature has focused on governance issues, 
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the emphasis has been on bureaucratic control of the allocation of production and distribution 
systems, generally from an internalization theory and, to a lesser extent, an RBT perspective. 
Filatotchev and Wright (2011), however, argue that it is becoming increasingly important to 
adopt an agency perspective that recognizes various dimensions of corporate governance, such as 
goal misalignment between managers and stakeholders, as well as managerial opportunism. 
More recent studies have indicated that internationalization strategies are associated with 
information asymmetries and substantial risks (Filatotchev et al., 2012; Gammeltoft et al., 2012). 
As a result, specific FDI decisions may also be related to a fit between business opportunities 
and risk preferences and decision-making horizons of managers and the other main shareholder 
constituencies as suggested by agency theory (Carpenter and Fredrickson, 2001).  
Since a firm’s degree of internationalization is an important determinant of the 
complexity it faces (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998), FDI strategy will depend on the ability of the 
parent to deal with information asymmetries and potential agency conflicts associated with 
overseas ventures. As FDI decisions typically require high levels of information, and given the 
low frequency and high duration with which they occur, these conditions also likely contribute to 
agency problems (Michael and Pearce, 2004). Therefore, the effectiveness of a firm’s FDI 
decisions may also depend on its governance characteristics, such as the distribution of 
ownership and control. However, the effects of the governance characteristics of the focal firm 
that undertakes FDI and how these change from emerging to mid-range economies remains 
relatively unexplored.  Here we see a promising opportunity for future research since the forms 
of observed governance models in mid-range economies represent a wide spectrum, from the 
direct governance involvement of the state in firms from countries such as Russia and China 
31 
 
(Quadrants 1 and 2), to family and insider control in large, publicly listed firms in India, Brazil 
and Korea (Quadrants 3 and 4). 
For example, a substantial body of research has focused on the governance roles of 
dominant blockholders, especially in the environment of emerging and less developed economies 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Jiang and Peng, 2011a, 2011b). In Southeast Asia and elsewhere, family 
owners and other blockholders have been identified as an important governance constituency that 
can shape strategic decisions, including internationalization (Boyd and Hoskisson, 2010; 
Claessens et al., 2000; Filatotchev et al., 2012; Globerman et al., 2011; La Porta et al., 2000; 
Majumdar et al., 2012; Peng and Jiang, 2010). For example,  presence of foreign institutional 
shareholders, rather than pure family ownership or non-family insider ownership, is generally 
associated with high commitment entry modes (Filatotchev et al., 2007) and shareholdings of 
controlling family, and of non-family insiders, in the parent company, and parent shareholding in 
the affiliate have significant effects on FDI location (Strange et al., 2009). Also, the fit between 
the form of corporate governance and international experience is a determinant of entry 
strategies affecting whether firms choose a joint venture or a wholly owned subsidiary as the 
preferred entry mode.  
What is unclear, however, is the extent to which the role of foreign institutional 
shareholders, family and non-family owners, and state-ownership changes along with the 
evolution of the general institutional context, as traditional emerging economies become mid-
range emerging economies (Jiang and Peng, 2011a, 2011b; Kim et al., 2012a; Kim et al., 2010). 
For example, to what extent do pyramidal structures of ownership persist and how does this 
influence internationalization? (e.g., how does this change for firms in Quadrant 4?). To what 
extent are family owned firms in mid-range emerging economies better able to exploit the 
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benefits of becoming transnational, as family members become embedded in host country 
markets to expand the family firm’s activities overseas?    
Buckley and Strange (2011) argue that both internalization theory and RBT perspectives 
emphasize the importance of bank- or family-centered business groups, in particular in 
developing and newly industrialized economies (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). This organizational 
form helps businesses, in particular in emerging markets, to overcome institutional 
imperfections, provide access to internal and external resources, buffer the company from risks, 
and develop international operations (e.g., Quadrant 1).  
Agency theory-based research, however, provides a different perspective on 
organizational outcomes of this form of organization. For example, the role of banks as 
shareholders provides obvious incentives for banks to behave opportunistically as a result of 
their multiple roles and access to information: banks may handle the accounts of companies and 
thus be intimately aware of their cash-flow positions, while at the same time offering financial 
services as investment brokers, management consultants, and agents in corporate finance, 
seeking funds for the company abroad. While these multiple roles offer significant economies of 
scope, other shareholders may be disadvantaged, as bank-shareholders may have too much 
influence within the firm, and banks may be more concerned with their short-term credit 
positions than with long-term investment prospects (Coffee, 1991). 
Agency research may help to re-assess recent evidence associated with the rapid 
development of bank holding companies in emerging economies. A particularly characteristic 
exemplification of this trend is the oil and gas and telecommunication industries in India, China, 
and Russia, which are dominated by holding companies such as Gazprom and PetroChina. These 
companies are fixing the boundaries of their international empires through intra-holding 
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consolidations, mergers, and single-share swaps. They are also characterized by concentrated, 
often state-controlled, ownership. Moreover, outside shareholders in each have suffered a 
dilution of their holdings. In addition, many industries in Russia have also experienced a rapid 
development of financial-industrial groups (FIGs) representing large diversified holding 
companies owned by banks, trading companies, and other organizations, ultimately controlled by 
a handful of well-connected oligarchs. On the other hand, to what extent do these organizations 
persist in economies in Quadrants 2, 3 and 4? 
Business groups and other holding companies may actively try to fend off pressures for 
their members to restructure (Kim et al., 2012a; Ramaswamy et al., 2012). Sometimes they may 
become simply a vehicle for creating pyramidal ownership structures. These structures can be 
used by controlling shareholders to make existing shareholders pay the costs, but not share all the 
benefits, of new ventures (La Porta et al., 2000). Perotti and Gelfer (2001) provide empirical 
evidence from Russia suggesting that, although members of FIGs have easier access to 
investment finance, their restructuring and performance is lower than that of non-group firms. 
This can result in traditional principal-agent problems, being supplanted by unique agency 
problems arising from principal-principal goal incongruence, which occurs when a dominant 
owner disregards the interests of minority owners (Douma et al., 2006; Young et al., 2008). 
Interestingly, Kim et al. (2010) found that business groups in the early stages of 
development in Korea were detrimental to the effectiveness of OFDI (Quadrant 4). However, as 
the economy developed and there was a consensus, even among dominant business groups, 
regarding the benefits of more transparent governance and intensive governance approaches, the 
effectiveness of such governance improved the relationship between business groups and 
internationalization. Kim et al. (2010) argued that the consensus dampened principal-principal 
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conflicts and provides more upside knowledge sharing among group-affiliated companies 
compared to firm independent of business groups. 
These diverse research streams suggest that corporate governance parameters of 
emerging multinationals may have a significant impact on business strategies such as M&As and 
corporate entrepreneurship (Majumdar et al., 2012). The traditional internalization theory 
approach limits our understanding of the behavior of emerging multinationals, because it fails to 
take account of the different risk preferences of managers and shareholders that may lead to 
differences in strategic objectives (Filatotchev and Wright, 2011). The need is to design a 
governance contract to align the interests of managers and shareholders rather than simply try to 
create governance structures that minimize the costs of undertaking a transaction (Tsao and 
Chen, 2012). Governance factors, such as ownership structure and types of dominant owners, 
board characteristics, and executive compensation, may have not only a significant impact on the 
internationalization strategies of emerging multinationals, but also determine performance 
outcomes of these strategic decisions. At present, we know little about the different types of 
dominant owners and board characteristics in emerging economies and how these change as the 
contexts in which these firms operate evolve into mid-range emerging economies. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Emerging economies by their nature are dynamic. More than two decades after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in Europe and of the development of market institutions elsewhere, a number of 
emerging economies can now be considered to be in the mid-range between newly developed 
and traditional emerging economies.  
This paper contributes to the literature by revisiting and extending Wright et al. (2005) 
with a particular focus on emerging multinationals from mid-range economies. Specifically, we 
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have argued it is time to move beyond a simple dichotomy that divides the world into emerging 
and developed economies. There is a need to consider more fine-grained notions of institutional 
context with varying degrees of institutional development and infrastructure and factor market 
development. These differences contribute to a reinvigoration and extension of the life-cycle of 
the agenda for strategy research in emerging economies. Given that most new multinational 
firms from emerging economies tend to be from these mid-range economies, examining these 
new multinationals offers new insights into how this heterogeneity of institutional contexts 
influences firm behavior. It also allows us to extend conceptual insights from AT, IT, RBT and 
TCT perspectives.  
In particular, we see scope for a more theoretical integration of IT with the other 
perspectives that provides for more fine-grained insights into the roles played by different 
institutional contexts. Differentiating between the economies from which these multinationals 
are emerging helps us understand better how new MNEs can establish competitive positions in 
host economies that are either less-developed or more-developed than their home countries. 
Appreciation of the variety of institutional factors underpinning the different mid-range 
emerging economies can help develop understanding of the spectrum of governance models 
observed in these economies and the implications for internationalization. It can also contribute 
to the development of a more fine-grained contextualized AT approach to governance in general.  
Different institutional and factor market development between types of mid-range emerging 
economies indicates that the transaction costs of different forms of entry into particular mid-
range emerging economies will vary significantly. This variety provides scope for further 
integration of TCT with different dimensions of institutional and factor market context. Injecting 
an institution-based view, inspired by IT, also helps extend the RBT of the firm. Incorporating an 
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institution-based view provides a more contextualized perspective, suggesting that the resources 
that firms need to achieve competitive advantage depend upon the type of host economy in 
which they are competing compared to their home country. Clearly, such future research can 
facilitate the deeper integration of IT and RBT, which we believe will not only add to our 
empirical knowledge about emerging economies, but also enhance the development of such 
theories of the firm that will have implications far beyond the context of emerging economies per 
se.  
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Figure 1: A New Typology of Emerging Economies
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Figure 2: Cluster Analysis of Mid-Range Emerging Economies 
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Table 1: Cluster Group Means Scores for Institutions and Infrastructure 
 
Cluster Group Mean Institution  
Score 
Mean Infrastructure  
Score 
Number 
of Countries 
1 3.08750  2.73375 8 
2 3.68417  4.68333 12 
3 3.39143  3.61571 14 
4 4.04500   3.76500 16 
5 4.78100  4.93100 10 
 
Table 2: Country Institution and Infrastructure Score and Cluster Group Membership 
 
 Country Institution Score   Infrastructure Score   Cluster 
1 Bangladesh  3.31 2.24 1 
2 Cote d’Ivoire  2.87 2.97 1 
3 Kenya  3.30 3.10 1 
4 Kyrgyzstan  2.91 2.77 1 
5 Nigeria  3.31 2.21 1 
6 Pakistan  3.36 2.77 1 
7 Philippines  3.22 3.09 1 
8 Venezuela  2.42 2.72 1 
9 Croatia  3.59 4.73 2 
10 Czech Republic  3.65 4.87 2 
11 Greece  3.52 4.54 2 
12 Hungary  3.79 4.52 2 
13 Korea  3.89 5.94 2 
14 Lithuania  3.94 4.64 2 
15 Russia  3.08 4.52 2 
16 Slovakia  3.46 4.23 2 
17 Slovenia  4.08 4.81 2 
18 Thailand  3.85 4.65 2 
19 Trinidad and Tobago  3.67 4.36 2 
20 Turkey  3.69 4.39 2 
21 Argentina  2.93 3.70 3 
22 Armenia  3.65 3.75 3 
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.32 3.24 3 
48 
 
 Country Institution Score   Infrastructure Score   Cluster 
24 Bulgaria  3.32 3.62 3 
25 Colombia  3.47 3.66 3 
26 Ecuador  3.11 3.39 3 
27 Jamaica  3.63 3.74 3 
28 Kazakhstan  3.54 3.70 3 
29 Macedonia  3.68 3.66 3 
30 Mexico  3.44 3.98 3 
31 Moldova  3.38 3.32 3 
32 Peru  3.54 3.62 3 
33 Romania  3.49 3.37 3 
34 Ukraine  2.98 3.87 3 
35 Albania  4.01 3.87 4 
36 Azerbijan  3.84 3.87 4 
37 Botswana  4.87 3.48 4 
38 Brazil  3.72 3.99 4 
39 Egypt  3.78 3.81 4 
40 Georgia  3.97 3.95 4 
41 Ghana  3.96 2.84 4 
42 India  3.84 3.60 4 
43 Indonesia  3.81 3.77 4 
44 Jordan  4.38 4.13 4 
45 Latvia  3.87 4.12 4 
46 Morocco  3.98 3.95 4 
47 Poland  4.17 3.87 4 
48 South Africa  4.36 4.02 4 
49 Sri Lanka  4.23 4.13 4 
50 Tajikistan  3.93 2.84 4 
51 Chile  5.06 4.67 5 
52 China  4.32 4.63 5 
53 Estonia  4.99 4.71 5 
54 Israel  4.81 4.98 5 
55 Malaysia  4.94 5.22 5 
56 Mauritius  4.54 4.33 5 
57 Portugal  4.20 5.48 5 
49 
 
 Country Institution Score   Infrastructure Score   Cluster 
58 Saudi Arabia  5.47 5.31 5 
59 Taiwan  4.94 5.62 5 
60 Tunisia  4.54 4.36 5 
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Table 3: Research Themes for Emerging Multinationals 
Emerging 
Economy  
Type 
 
Research  
Theme 
Low Institution 
Development/Low 
Infrastructure and 
Factor Market 
Development 
(Quadrant 1) 
Low Institution 
Development/High 
Infrastructure and Factor 
Market Development 
(Quadrant 2) 
High Institution 
Development/Weak 
Infrastructure and Factor 
Market Development 
(Quadrant 3) 
High Institution 
Development/High 
Infrastructure and Factor 
Market Development 
(Quadrant 4) 
Government 
Influence 
• To what extent 
do restrictive 
government 
regulations 
continue to 
give the 
incentive to 
register as 
foreign firms?  
• To what extent 
does government 
influence continue 
to be directive with 
financial and 
informational 
support? 
• To what extent has 
government support 
been reduced? How 
has indirect 
government 
involvement 
influenced OFDI 
through government 
supported financial 
institutions? 
• To what extent has 
government 
influence become 
less directive?  
Research 
Orchestration and 
Strategic 
Entrepreneurship 
• To what extent 
does resource 
transferability 
remain limited 
to other 
emerging 
economies 
with weak 
institutions and 
factor 
markets? 
• To what extent are 
internationalization 
strategies 
increasingly 
resource seeking? 
Are resources 
sought more likely 
to be primary 
materials? 
• To what extent do 
firms seek foreign 
acquisitions to 
provide resources 
and/or brands? 
 
• To what extent 
have 
internationalization 
strategies become 
more market 
seeking? Is there 
more emphasis on 
entry in developed 
markets to better 
capabilities? 
Entry Strategies • To what extent 
do acquirers 
continue to 
focus on a 
• How have 
acquisition 
strategies evolved 
to play to factor 
• What is the impact 
on type of sectors for 
which entry is 
facilitated? How has 
• To what extent has 
internationalization 
evolved beyond the 
close region? 
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(declining) 
number of 
opportunities 
in other weak 
emerging 
economies? • To what extent 
are 
acquisitions 
left with little 
monitoring 
from the 
parent? 
market strengths? • How do 
acquisitions 
facilitate learning 
about 
environments with 
stronger market 
institutions? 
this evolved? • How has the role of 
returning expatriate 
entrepreneurs 
changed as they 
become more 
confident about the 
institutional context? 
• To what extent has 
a more even 
balance been 
achieved between 
different entry 
modes? • To what extent are 
acquisitions 
integrated closely 
into the acquirer? 
 
